Courts are not alone in accepting as constitutionally valid the legal principle that Swann enunciatedi.e., that the government may voluntarily adopt race-conscious measures to improve conditions of race even when it is not under a constitutional obligation to do so. Statements after the decision As a result of this Courts insistence on strict scrutiny of that policy, but see id., at 538547, inmates in the California prisons were killed. of Ed., 395 U. S. 225, 232 (1969) (approving a lower court desegregation order that provided that the [school] board must move toward a goal under which in each school the ratio of white to Negro faculty members is substantially the same as it is throughout the system, and immediately requiring [t]he ratio of Negro to white teachers in each school to be equal to the ratio of Negro to white teachers in the system as a whole). See 39 Ill. 2d, at 599600, 237 N.E. 2d, at 502 (Too, the United States Supreme Court on January 15, 1968, dismissed an appeal in School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education, (Mass. First, in an open choice district like that in Seattle, using race as an isolated factor for admission may deny some students the opportunity to attend the school of their choice, thereby burdening those families affected. Id., at 8391. Because Louisville could use race-based measures only as a remedy for past de jure segregation, it is not incoherent, post, at 56, to say that race-based decisionmaking was allowed to Louisville one daywhile it was still remedyingand forbidden to it the nextwhen remediation was finished. However, allegations in complaints cannot substitute for specific findings of prior discriminationeven when those allegations lead to settlements with complaining parties. First, the school districts plans serve compelling interests and are narrowly tailored on any reasonable definition of those terms. 3, p.8 ([W]e take the unqualified position that the Fourteenth Amendment has totally stripped the state of power to make race and color the basis for governmental action); Tr. After preliminary rulings and an eventual victory for the plaintiffs in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the District Court in July 1975 entered an order requiring desegregation. Because [o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens, such race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional. By way of contrast, I do not claim to know how best to stop harmful discrimination; how best to create a society that includes all Americans; how best to overcome our serious problems of increasing de facto segregation, troubled inner city schooling, and poverty correlated with race. He also wrote about the unsettled debate concerning whether racial balance or diversity has a positive effect on educational outcomes. The dissents characterization of Swann as recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve positive race-related goals isat besta dubious inference. One can attempt to identify a construction of Jefferson Countys student assignment plan that, at least as a logical matter, complies with these competing propositions; but this does not remedy the underlying problem. The basic problem with the pluralitys technical dicta-based response lies in its overly theoretical approach to case law, an approach that emphasizes rigid distinctions between holdings and dicta in a way that serves to mask the radical nature of todays decision. The majority suggests that Seattles classification system could permit a school to be labeled diverse with a 50% Asian-American and 50% white student body, and no African-American students, Hispanic students, or students of other ethnicity. The boards work in communities where demographic patterns change, where they must meet traditional learning goals, where they must attract and retain effective teachers, where they should (and will) take account of parents views and maintain their commitment to public school education, where they must adapt to court intervention, where they must encourage voluntary student and parent actionwhere they will find that their own good faith, their knowledge, and their understanding of local circumstances are always necessary but often insufficient to solve the problems at hand. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 328, in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny purposes, a government interest in student body diversity in the context of higher education is compelling. Law is not an exercise in mathematical logic. First, as demonstrated above, the two concepts are distinct. The Seattle School District has begun providing transportation to students who live more than 2.5 miles from their assigned high school. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the Seattle School Districts use of race was valid under the state constitution. [12] In order to survive strict scrutiny analysis, "a narrowly tailored plan" must be presented in order to achieve a "compelling government interest. Protection jurisprudence of this Court and the notion of a color-blind Constitution that this country has aspired for. . Indeed, the plans before us are more narrowly tailored than the race-conscious admission plans that this Court approved in Grutter. Justice Breyer questioned the utility "of looking simply to whether earlier school segregation was de jure or de facto in order to draw firm lines separating the constitutionally permissible from the constitutionally forbidden use of 'race-conscious' criteria. Hist. You can explore additional available newsletters here. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. See App. My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlans view in Plessy: Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). Jefferson County estimates that the racial guidelines account for only 3 percent of assignments. in KentuckyThe Second Year After the Supreme Courts Decision, 25 J. Negro Educ. In Brown, this Court held that the governments segregation of schoolchildren by race violates the Constitutions promise of equal protection. This is because "'racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification.'" were race-neutral) does not indicate the decline in black achieve- What emerges is a version of strict scrutiny that combines hollow assurances of harmlessness with reflexive acceptance of conventional wisdom. See supra, at 12. No. Id., at 462. As Justice Marshall said, unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 783 (1974) (dissenting opinion). The original litigation eventually became a lawsuit against the Jefferson County School System, which in April 1975 absorbed Louisvilles schools and combined them with those of the surrounding suburbs. Indeed, in 1968, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a race-conscious state law seeking to undo de facto segregation: To support [their] claim, the defendants heavily rely on three Federal cases, each of which held, no State law being involved, that a local school board does not have an affirmative constitutional duty to act to alleviate racial imbalance in the schools that it did not cause. Post, at 28 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. See Brief for Petitioner at 35. It provided that each elementary school would have a black student population of between 15% and 50%; each middle and high school would have a black population and a white population that fell within a range, the boundaries of which were set at 15% above and 15% below the general student population percentages in the county at that grade level. The dissents persistent refusal to accept this distinctionits insistence on viewing the racial classifications here as if they were just like the ones in McDaniel, devised to overcome a history of segregated public schools, post, at 47explains its inability to understand why the remedial justification for racial classifications cannot decide these cases. In 20002001, when the racial tiebreaker was last used, Ballards total enrollment was 17.5 percent Asian-American, 10.8 percent African-American, 10.7 percent Latino, 56.4 percent Caucasian, and 4.6 percent Native-American. . See Brief for Respondents in No. The Seattle Board Statement Reaffirming Diversity Rationale speaks of the inherent educational value in [p]roviding students the opportunity to attend schools with diverse student enrollment, App. As becomes clearer when the districts plan is further considered, Jefferson County has explained how and when it employs these classifications only in terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Finally, the kind of deference that the Supreme Court will give the School District will also have implications. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. See, e.g., Swann, supra, at 16; Seattle School Dist. Due to a variety of factorssome influenced by government, some notneighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole. [31], The opinion came less than two months before the start of the regular school year in King County and less than three weeks before the start of year-round school in the District. Sometimes a court refers to it as an interest in achieving racial diversity. Other times a court, like the plurality here, refers to it as an interest in racial balancing. I have used more general terms to signify that interest, describing it, for example, as an interest in promoting or preserving greater racial integration of public schools. ; see also ante, at 22, n.15 (plurality opinion). PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. Yesterday, the plans under review were lawful. See Juris. Consequently, the present plans expand student choice; they limit the burdens (including busing) that earlier plans had imposed upon students and their families; and they use race-conscious criteria in limited and gradually diminishing ways. 05908, p. 511. For example, the dissent features Tometz v. Board of Ed., Waukegan City School Dist. 2. exemplifies the long-running disagreement over the meaning of racial discrimination under the Constitution. See Brief for Respondents in No. The Department of Education has characterized this as a compelling interest in regulations and various other statements. Roberts cites to: Grutter, supra, at 327, 328, 334, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. 1. Ante, at 1718 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). "It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much," Justice Breyer said of the Court's decision. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion). Seattles racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of students between schools. While diversity may lend to a robust education, parents and students have their own opinions on what factors promote the best education possible. 2d 834 (WD Ky. 2004); McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. But if the plan was lawful when it was first adopted and if it was lawful the day before the District Court dissolved its order, how can the plurality now suggest that it became unlawful the following day? Which of the following statements offers the most accurate comparison between this case and the decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)? In 1963, at the insistence of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other community groups, the school board adopted a new race-based transfer policy. Without it, some schools such as Cleveland and Ranier would have remained substantially dominated by minorities, while minority students were denied the opportunity to attend the popular schools outside their neighborhoods. A comparison of the test results of the v. Seattle Sch. ), I shall adopt the first alternative. L.Rev. Conversely, to take another example, evidence from a district in Norfolk, Virginia, shows that resegregated schools led to a decline in the achievement test scores of children of all races. A Connecticut statute states that its student choice program will seek to preserve racial and ethnic balance. Conn. Gen. Stat. The plans at issue are not overly different from other plans that school districts have used with the express or implicit approval of courts. in No. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Are courts really to treat as merely de facto segregated those school districts that avoided a federal order by voluntarily complying with Browns requirements? It is not clear why the racial guidelines were even applied to Joshuas transfer applicationthe guidelines supposedly do not apply at the kindergarten level. The Seattle School district and Jefferson County district have applications that require a parent to state what the race of his or her child is. Accord, post, at 48 ([L]ocal school boards better understand their own communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the educational needs of their pupils); post, at 66 ([W]hat of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by States and school boards?); ibid. I cannot endorse that conclusion. The classification of applicants by race upheld in Grutter was only as part of a highly individualized, holistic review, 539 U. S., at 337. 1995). The Court also found that the magnet programs available at the high school in question were not available at other high schools in the school district. 540, 541 (2003) (hereinafter Quillian & Campbell); Dawkins & Braddock, The Continuing Significance of Desegregation: School Racial Composition and African American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. Negro Ed. of Oral Arg. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 The next tiebreaker depends upon the racial composition of the particular school and the race of the individual student. App. It simply recognizes that judges are not well suited to act as school administrators. v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971) (no absolute prohibition against [the] use of mathematical ratios as a starting point); Swann, 402 U. S., at 2425 (approving the use of a ratio reflecting the racial composition of the whole school system as a useful starting point, but not as an inflexible requirement). Third, real-world efforts to substitute racially diverse for racially segregated schools (however caused) are complex, to the point where the Constitution cannot plausibly be interpreted to rule out categorically all local efforts to use means that are conscious of the race of individuals. The first tiebreaker selects for admission students who have a sibling currently enrolled in the chosen school. Indeed, it is a cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950s to Louisville and Seattle in the modern dayto equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school closer to home was initially declined). See, e.g., App. While this Court has permitted the States to legislate or otherwise officially act experimentally in the social and economic fields, it has always recognized and held that this power is subject to the limitations of the Constitution, and that the tests of the Constitution must be met); Reply Brief for Appellants in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. 1, p. 51 (The delicate nature of the problem of segregation and the paramount interest of the State of Kansas in preserving the internal peace and tranquility of its people indicates that this is a question which can best be solved on the local level, at least until Congress declares otherwise). First, there is a historical and remedial element: an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. 1", Learn how and when to remove this template message, Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, "PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. SEATTLE: THE END OF RACE BASED SCHOOL POPULATIONS", "Schools Are More Segregated Today Than During the Late 1960s", "PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. However, the government is entitled to consider race as one of several factors in determining school admissions and enrollment. 2d 834, 837, 864 (WD Ky. 2004). This will be weighed against the consequences of using race as an isolated factor in classifying students. I have long adhered to the view that a decision to exclude a member of a minority because of his race is fundamentally different from a decision to include a member of a minority for that reason. McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. There is ample precedent in the decisions of this Court to uphold school segregation); Brief for Petitioners in Gebhart v. Belton, O.T. 1952, No. A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. It gave second preference to a student whose race differed from a race that was over-represented at the school (i.e., a race that accounted for a higher percentage of the school population than of the total district population). As the Court recently reaffirmed, racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); brackets omitted). . But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. The dissent half-heartedly attacks the historical underpinnings of the color-blind Constitution. of New Kent Cty., 391 U. S. 430, 441442 (1968). In 1987, the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights studied 125 large school districts seeking integration. For instance, a Texas appeals court in 1986 rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a voluntary integration plan by explaining: [T]he absence of a court order to desegregate does not mean that a school board cannot exceed minimum requirements in order to promote school integration. Moreover, the democratic interest has no durational limit, contrary to Grutters command. Louisville began its integration efforts in earnest when a federal court in 1975 entered a school desegregation order.